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Abstract 
Academic research on whether social networks influence financial outcomes is still undeveloped. 
The literature has typically focused on three major questions – whether social networks affect 
investor behavior, firm behavior, or intermediary behavior. Because the theoretical framework in 
finance is organized around an accepted set of paradigms, and because data on intermediaries 
and firms have been publicly available for a long time, the financial economics area has just 
started using big data in its analysis. This note describes the extant research in this area and 
outlines how the field is likely to evolve. 
Highlights 
• The major research questions for financial economists involve analysing investor 
behavior, firm behavior, or intermediary behavior 
• Since firm data has been publicly available for a long time, most research on social 
networks in affecting financial outcomes does not use big data 
• This is changing and future research, especially research on investor behavior, is likely to 
use big data analysis. 
Introduction 
Economists typically analyze either cross-sectional, time series, or panel data that fits in a 
spreadsheet or a statistical database. While these approaches are gradually being replaced by big 
data analyses in other disciplines (see Einav and Levin, 2014 for examples of econometric 
analyses using big data techniques), these approaches have not typically been used by financial 
economists who are interested in how social networks impact financial outcomes. The reason is 
because financial economists work with clearly defined theoretical priors. To test these priors 
does not always require extremely large datasets, which are more suited to situations where the 
model itself is uncertain. 1  
Financial economists are usually concerned with three major research questions: how do 
investors choose to invest (a portfolio choice problem), how firms direct these investments to 
                                                           
1 Varian (2014) differentiates between big data analysis and regular economic analysis in noting that the sheer size 
of big datasets may require more powerful data manipulation tools. There may be more potential predictors than 
appropriate for estimation, so variable selection is necessary. Large datasets may also allow for more flexible 
relationships than simple linear models. Finally, machine learning techniques such as decision trees, support vector 
machines, neural nets, and deep learning, may allow for more effective ways to model complex relationships. 
investment opportunities (a firm investment decision), and how intermediaries manage to match 
the lenders (investors) with the firms (borrowers). The questions of interest in this note are 
whether social relationships influence investor behavior (the portfolio choice problem or other 
financial decisions), firm behavior (the investment decision or other firm policy decisions), or 
the matching process.  
The papers surveyed in this note typically use unusual micro-level data on social networks 
to address these questions. Examples of these types of data discussed in this note include 
characteristics for an entire population from country administrative registers (typically 
Scandinavian countries), insider trading networks, and loan level data from microfinance 
institutions.  
Social networks and investor behavior 
The first type of financial outcome relates to whether social networks affect portfolio 
choices made by investors. In particular, papers in this stream examine how information diffuses 
through social networks. Among the earliest papers in this field, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) 
argue that social investors find the market more attractive when more of their peers participate. 
They use data from the Health and Retirement Study administered by the Institute for Social 
Research at the University of Michigan. This survey, first conducted in 1992, surveys 
approximately 7,500 households who have a member born during the period 1931 through 1941, 
and asks whether people interact with their neighbors or attend church, a group that Hong, 
Kubik, and Stein call social households. They find that social households are substantially more 
likely to invest in the market than non-social households, controlling for wealth, race, education, 
and risk tolerance. Similarly, Ivković and Weisbenner (2007) study the relation between 
households’ actual stock purchases and stock purchases made by their neighbors using a popular 
data set of common-stock investments in 35,673 U.S. households made through a large discount 
brokerage in the period from 1991 to 1996. Till a few years ago, this dataset was largely the only 
dataset on actual portfolio choice by individuals in the United States. Ivković and Weisbenner 
(2007) attribute approximately 25-50% of the correlation between households’ stock purchases 
and stock purchases made by their neighbors to word-of-mouth communication.  
More recent papers have drawn on other datasets, both survey and direct. For example, 
Changwony, Campbell, and Tabner (2014) examine information diffusion through two channels 
of social interaction: frequency of talking to neighbors and involvement in social groups using 
survey data from around 14,000 individuals in 5,500 households covered by the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS). They find that weak ties (social group involvement) between 
individuals positively impacts overall stock market participation while strong ties (frequency of 
talking to neighbors) have no effect. Knüpfer, Rantapuska, and Sarvimäki (2017) use Finnish 
country population characteristics from Statistics Finland and the Finnish Tax Administration to 
show that workers who are adversely affected by the Finnish Great Depression in the 1990s, 
invest less in stock markets. The effects appear to travel through social networks: individuals 
whose neighbors and family members experienced adverse circumstances also avoid risky 
investments. Rau and Wardrop (2017) examine how local bias, the predisposition of investors to 
invest in local firms, is affected by the physical distances from other types of investors, 
specifically super-investors (investors who invest extremely large amounts in specific 
investments), in influencing investment in a novel financial instrument, micro-bonds directly 
issued by the firm to its investors without a financial intermediary involved. Physical distances to 
these investors appears as, if not more, important to investment than the physical distance to the 
firm. One issue with these papers is that they do not provide direct evidence of person-to-person 
communication among investors. Ahern (2017) provides some evidence of direct peer-to-peer 
communication, using a relatively small but novel hand-collected dataset to analyze the social 
relationships that underlie illegal insider trading networks. He shows that inside information 
flows through strong social ties based on family, friends, and geographic proximity. Inside 
traders earn striking returns of 35% over 21 days, with more central traders earning greater 
returns. 
A second related question of concern to financial economists is whether the presence of 
social networks increases market efficiency, the speed with which information is incorporated 
into stock prices. Han and Yang (2013) develop a rational expectations equilibrium model to 
explore this question and show that when information is exogenous, social communication 
improves market efficiency. However, social communication also crowds out information 
production due to traders’ incentives to “free ride” on their informed friends. Overall, social 
communication hurts market efficiency when information is endogenous. There is little empirical 
evidence on this issue. 
A third question relevant to this research topic is how the network positions of the first 
individuals in a society to receive information about a new product affect its eventual diffusion. 
To answer this question, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2013) develop a model 
of information diffusion through a social network that discriminates between information passing 
(individuals must be aware of the product before they can adopt it, and they can learn from their 
friends) and endorsement (the decisions of informed individuals to adopt the product might be 
influenced by their friends’ decisions), and apply it to the diffusion of microfinance loans, in a 
setting where the set of potentially first-informed individuals is known. They find that the 
centrality of the first-informed individuals in a village helps significantly in predicting eventual 
adoption.  
A relatively unexplored issue in financial economics is whether firms can create peer 
influence and social contagion by designing viral features into their products and marketing 
campaigns. While there are no financial economics papers on this issue because financial data is 
usually highly confidential, a couple of marketing papers do use big data to analyze this 
question. Aral and Walker (2011, 2014) conduct randomized field experiments where they use 
viral messaging capabilities for 9,687 recruited users on Facebook.com to exchange messages 
with their 1.4 million friends. They find that viral features generate econometrically identifiable 
peer influence and social contagion effects, with passive-broadcast viral features in particular, 
proving most effective in increasing peer influence and social contagion. Physical interaction 
between friends, measured by co-appearance in photos, does not have an effect. Manski (1995) 
argues that self-selection bias makes it harder to draw inferences about the general population 
from a self-selected sample of recruited subjects. In addition, a generalizable analysis is limited 
to observations that are made without intrusion, since people’s behavior may change when they 
know they are being observed.  
To avoid the problem of self-selection and observation bias, Bapna and Umyarov (2015) use 
a randomized experiment that tests the existence of causal peer influence in the general 
population (3.8 million users) of the last.FM online social network. The experiment, which did 
not involve subject recruitment for experimentation, involved the researchers randomly selecting 
users from the group to receive premium subscription status. These users could not deny the gift 
or hide its status, ruling out any subject self-selection, impact of individual characteristics, or 
contextual (observed or unobserved) decisions that might confound the analysis. They find that 
peer influence causes more than a 60% increase in odds of buying the service due to the 
influence coming from an adopting friend. In addition, users with smaller numbers of friends 
experience stronger relative increase in their adoption likelihood due to influence from their 
peers compared to users with larger numbers of friends.  
Researchers have also examined other financial choices by investors. For example, Miller 
(2015) examines how social networks affect a household’s bankruptcy decision. Social networks 
can provide information about the required paperwork, recommend attorneys, reduce social 
stigma associated with bankruptcy, or increase awareness of its benefits. Using a sample from 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), she exploits county and racial variation in 
bankruptcy to identify network effects and examines whether being surrounded by others of the 
same race increases bankruptcy use more for those in racial groups with high filing rates. She 
finds a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between availability of contacts 
potentially advising on bankruptcy and the bankruptcy filing rate of the investor’s racial group. 
Social networks and firm behavior 
In this stream of research, financial economists typically ask if the presence of social 
networks affects firm policy. The dependent variables here usually consist of firm level data on 
firm policy, while the explanatory variables consist (mostly) of social connections between 
managers, board members, and financial intermediaries. As an example of connections between 
managers and financial intermediaries, Javakhadze, Ferris, and French (2016) construct a panel 
dataset of managerial social connections via education, employment and other social activities, 
using the BoardEx database provided by Management Diagnostics Limited. They find that 
managerial social capital, proxied by managerial social connections to financier firms, is 
positively associated with investment sensitivity to the Tobin’s Q of the firm, a measure of 
growth opportunities. The effect of social capital is stronger in a market characterized by weak 
legal protection of investors. Similarly, Engleberg, Gao, and Parsons (2012) show that when 
banks and firms are connected through interpersonal linkages – such as their respective 
management having attended college or previously worked together – interest rates are markedly 
reduced, comparable with single shifts in credit ratings. As an example of connections between 
board members leading to changes in firm policy, Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2012) test whether 
earnings management behavior spreads between firms via shared directors. They find that a firm 
is more likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a firm that is currently 
managing earnings and is less likely to manage earnings when it shares a common director with a 
non-manipulator. Similarly, Cai, Dhaliwal, Kim and Pan (2014) examine whether board 
connections through shared directors influence firm disclosure policies and find that firms are 
more likely to stop providing quarterly earnings guidance if they share directors with previous 
guidance stoppers.  
Social networks and financial intermediary behavior 
Finally, financial economists typically examine if the presence of social networks affects the 
matching process between investors and firms. The dependent variables here usually consist of 
either investor level portfolio choices or firm behavior, while the explanatory variables consist 
(mostly) of social connections between either investors or managers and financial intermediaries. 
As an example, Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2010) study how social networks affect analysts’ 
ability to gather superior information about firms. They collect data on the educational 
background of sell-side analysts and senior corporate officers from online sources such as 
ZoomInfo, and show that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock 
recommendations when they have an educational link to the company.  
Future directions and conclusion 
Academic research on whether social networks influence financial outcomes is still in its 
infancy. The literature has typically focused on three major questions – whether social networks 
affect investor behavior, firm behavior, or intermediary behavior. The evidence on the latter two 
comes from large datasets that have been available on listed firms going back nearly a century. 
Because the theoretical framework in finance is organized around a broadly accepted set of 
paradigms, and because data on intermediaries and firms have been publicly available for so 
long, the financial economics area has typically not made much use of big data. The area of 
investor behavior appears likely to be the area that is most likely to use big data analysis to 
answer research questions. Among the most promising appears to be the analysis of transaction-
level data obtained from individual peer-to-peer crowdfunding platforms such as debt-, equity-, 
reward- or donation-based platforms. Examples of this type of research include Michels (2012), 
Zhang, and Liu (2012), Lin, Prabhala, and Viswanathan (2013), and Iyer, Khwaja, Luttmer, and 
Shue (2016), all use data from Prosper.com, a large peer-to-peer (P2P) lending website in the 
United States (US), Li and Martin (2016) and Mollick and Nanda (2016), use data from 
Kickstarter, a reward-based platform in the US, while Bi, Liu, and Usman (2017) use data from a 
reward-based platform in China. These papers delve into micro-level questions such as whether 
individuals are better able to screen their peer’s creditworthiness than formal credit scoring 
methodology. The Centre for Alternative Finance, hosted at the University of Cambridge is 
drawing on this type of data to analyze individual borrower and investor profiles for significant 
sections of the United Kingdom (UK) peer-to-peer universe, in association with the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) in the UK.2 Understanding investor profiles is also likely to have an 
impact on future regulation in the UK.  
Understanding how the legal regime of a country has an impact on the borrowing and 
lending behavior of individuals in the country is another likely target of future research. In the 
UK, for example, peer-to-peer equity issues do not have to be registered, unlike in the United 
States. It is plausible that the process of registration generates formal standardized information 
that investors can use to price securities. If so, it is equally plausible that registration or 
disclosure requirements will have an impact on the growth rate of markets in different countries. 
While no individual-level study has examined this question, Rau (2017) shows that the volume 
of crowdfunding at the country level is negatively related to the ease of setting up a formal 
business in the country, consistent with the hypothesis that because regulations form barriers to 
formal entry, platforms that surmount these barriers are treated as better quality by investors. 
However, because there are significant legal and privacy concerns to using data that is 
identifiable to individuals or providers, some research questions are currently more difficult to 
answer than others. For example, it is likely to be relatively difficult to track individuals across 
platforms. Here too, there are promising avenues for future research. The Payments Services 
Directive 2 (PSD2), due to be implemented across the European Union in 2018, will force banks 
to share customer-account information with licensed financial services providers. With suitable 
anonymization, access to these datasets can allow academics to potentially analyze investor 
behavior in much greater detail. 
                                                           
2 See Williams, A., 2016, FCA asks University of Cambridge to help it understand P2P, Financial Times, September 
30, 2016 (available at https://www.ft.com/content/d5635e3a-8642-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5). The FCA issued a 
press release describing the feedback to the post-implementation review of the FCA crowdfunding rules (available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/feedback/fs16-13.pdf). Section 5.8 discusses the collaboration with the CCAF. 
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